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The tax gap is a phenomenon experienced by revenue collection agencies which describes the difference between the taxes 
due, as prescribed by legislation, and the actual taxes collected. The tax gap is mostly a result of taxpayer non-compliance, 
such as the failure to submit a tax return. Recent theories suggest that a taxpayer’s social structure is a significant determinant 
of a taxpayer’s attitude towards tax compliance. This study explores the proposal that social network analysis through 
decision support systems can facilitate the objective of revenue collection agencies to minimize the tax gap. The results 
suggest that an agency’s limited enforcement capacity can achieve a greater impact on tax compliance by focusing on non-
compliant social structures as opposed to single instances of non-compliance. The research fills a gap in literature by 
demonstrating IT’s value proposition towards government financial services. 
Keywords 
Decision support systems, business intelligence, social network analysis, tax gap, tax compliance 
INTRODUCTION 
Revenue collection agencies world-wide have the responsibility of collecting taxes, duties and levies. The South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) performs this role in South Africa. Similar to other agencies, SARS experiences a phenomenon 
referred to as the tax gap which, in its simplest form, is described as the difference between the taxes due (as determined by 
legislation) and the actual taxes collected (OECD, 2008:10). The nature of the tax gap problem causes it to be a widespread 
and continuous challenge for revenue collection agencies (Slemrod, 2007:45). 
Effective and efficient decision-making in revenue collection agencies is critical in addressing the tax gap. The limited 
resource capacity of revenue collection agencies emphasizes the critical role of decision-making to optimally support 
business operations. In the case of revenue collection agencies, one such example is the management of tax compliance and 
risk, which aims to minimize the tax gap (OECD, 2004:6). Amongst others, information systems and specifically decision 
support systems (DSS) facilitate organizational decision making by presenting decision makers with relevant information 
(Sun and Liu, 2001:247). 
A DSS is a technological implementation that is used in conjunction with the cognitive actions of humans and is aimed at 
facilitating the decision-making process. A DSS utilizes data that is manipulated in a modeling layer and displayed as 
information through an interface (Shim, Warkentin, Courtney, Power, Sharda and Carlsson, 2002:111) for consumption by 
the decision-maker. One instance of DSS is that of Social Network Analysis (SNA). SNA visually displays a complex 
network of relationships between entities which might otherwise have been hidden in the data. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Tax Gap 
The tax gap within the United States (US) is estimated at a considerable gross value of 16.3%, totaling $40.7 billion for 2001 
taxes, and has tripled in value based over the past two decades (Leviner, 2009:382). The estimated tax gap of other equivalent 
high-income countries ranges between 4% and 17% (Slemrod, 2007:33). South Africa’s tax gap value for the same time 
period of 2001 is estimated at 13.9% approximately equating to R30 billion (Oberholzer and Stack, 2009:738). The 
management of tax compliance and risk uses different enforcement capabilities to address the tax gap of which tax audits 
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(OECD, 2008:16) and telephonic engagements with non-compliant taxpayers are most effective. However, in reality the 
enforcement capacity of revenue collection agencies is fractional in comparison with the potential number of non-compliant 
taxpayers. For example, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit capability annually covers a limited 1% to 2% of their 
tax register (Akinboade, Kinfack, Mokwena and Kumo, 2009:1129). This coverage percentage is believed to be consistent 
with other revenue collection agencies, including SARS. It is therefore critical for revenue collection agencies to optimally 
execute their enforcement capacity by using minimal resources to achieve a maximum audience. 
Taxpayer Non-compliance 
Past Perspectives 
Taxpayer non-compliance has traditionally been approached from two perspectives. The first perspective was accepted by 
various academics in the past and more recently again supported by Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (2004:120). The 
continuous monitoring of taxpayer compliance supported by rigorous enforcement is the only manner in which non-
compliance can be minimized. It was therefore believed that an increased enforcement effort will ultimately lead to increased 
taxpayer compliance. The second perspective suggests that taxpayer non-compliance is mostly driven by a taxpayer’s 
decision to maximize personal financial interest against the probability of being detected (Dell’Anno, 2009:995; Leviner, 
2009:389). This perspective is often referred to as the deterrence model, which is based on the utility theory originally 
published by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). 
Recent Perspectives 
Academics such as Kirchler (2007:107) have illustrated that an intensified enforcement capacity can also have undesired 
effects and even contrasting consequences. For example, the introduction of excessive penalties is likely to result in 
compliance resistance by taxpayers, and perhaps even promote bribery and corruption. This will consequently result in lower 
taxes collected and ultimately lead to the distrust of the revenue collection agency. 
Recent opinions have evolved to a multi-level perspective in which taxpayers are considered to be part of a greater ‘whole’ 
(Torgler, 2007:5). From this perspective, the influences and consequences of tax non-compliance have a much larger impact 
than previously considered. Braithwaite (2003:49) describes ‘the whole’ to consist of multiple levels ranging from an 
individual level (focusing on the taxpayer), a group level (certain segments such as turnover, geography and tax type, to name 
but a few) and society (the collective to which the tax system applies). However, one must acknowledge taxpayer non-
compliance to have a ‘social multiplier effect’ when considering that a taxpayer forms part of the greater whole (Fortin, 
Lacroix and Villeval, 2007:2090). This implies that the successful non-compliance of one taxpayer is likely to also prompt 
non-compliance of another taxpayer. 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) 
DSS is the specific instance of information systems that focus on the enablement of managerial decision-making (Arnott and 
Pervan, 2005:67). DSS historically mainly supported personal decision-making, but recent DSS developments have made 
significant contributions in the field of group decision-making. DSS evolved substantially in the fields of data warehouses, 
business intelligence and data mining whilst also embracing web technologies (Shim et al. 2002:112). Power (2002:13-16) 
takes a more functional perspective when categorizing DSS as being either data-driven, model-driven or knowledge-driven. 
Data-driven DSS store large volumes of data and provide an interface for the data to be accessed. Such examples are data 
warehouses and business intelligence reporting. Model-driven DSS are parameter-driven statistical and analytical tools 
allowing users to analyze a particular situation, such as those used in SNA. Knowledge driven DSS simulates, in a limited 
manner, certain human intellectual capabilities and consequently recommend specific actions to users based on certain 
criteria in the data. 
SNA is a specific instance of model-driven DSS that visually represents the relationships amongst entities in a specific social 
structure. SNA is used to identify key entities in a particular network, illuminate hidden relationships between loosely 
connected entities and to visually explore the manner in which entities are grouped (Carley, Diesner, Reminga and Tsvetovat, 
2007:1325). Jyun-Cheng and Chui-Chen (2008:1670) explain SNA relationships to be in the form of either groups or 
networks. Entities in group relationships have specific interactions in dense proximity, whereas network relationships have a 
variety of interactions in wide proximity – at times also consisting of many group relationships. Examples of SNA are 
illustrated in Figure 1. In its simplest form, a group or network consists of two entities linked through a relationship. The 
addition of entities to a group will result in an increase of relationships and ultimately convert a group structure to a network 
structure. 
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Figure 1. Social Network Analysis 
Managing Tax Compliance through Decision Support Systems 
Much like any other organization, tax compliance can be managed at a strategic, operational and tactical level, as presented in 
Figure 2 (OECD, 2008:10). Strategic compliance management considers the tax system in its entirety whereas operational 
compliance management focuses on whole taxpayer segments. Tactical compliance management considers targeted 
individuals, or groups of which social structures such as marriage, employee and employer relationships and tax consultant 
and taxpayer relationships are but a few examples. The different DSS defined by Power (2002:13-16) can be associated with 
the types of compliance-management levels. Knowledge driven DSS are associated with strategic management, data driven 
DSS with operational management, and model driven DSS with tactical management. Model driven DSS is often used to 
conduct SNA, and DSS tools such as Analyst Notebook and SAS are widely recognized as industry leaders in this domain. 
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Figure 2. Compliance Management and Decision Support Systems (Derived from OECD, 2008:10; Power, 2002:13-16) 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Despite the significance of the tax gap phenomenon, very little academic literature addresses IT’s value proposition to 
minimize taxpayer non-compliance. In particular, hardly any literature exists which explores how DSS can facilitate the 
management of tax compliance and risk through SNA. Some publications do exist which propose DSS frameworks for the 
private sector. However, the distinct nature of the public sector and especially revenue collection agencies allows for limited 
value to be derived from these publications – at most through theory abstraction and generalization. After all, more than two 
decades ago Henderson and Schilling (1985:157) referred to IT and specifically DSS when they stated “[d]esigning a[n IT] 
solution to a public sector problem is largely an art”. 
Given the limited enforcement capacity of revenue collection agencies together with the proposition that a taxpayer is 
influenced by his/her social structure, an opportunity exists for SNA to enhance the manner in which revenue collection 
agencies enforce tax compliance. If a taxpayer’s compliance is indeed influenced by social structure, then the inverse might 
also prove true, namely that a taxpayer’s non-compliance can be indirectly influenced by social structure when a revenue 
collection agency’s enforcement effort impacts the social structure. 
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WORKING THEORIES 
Kinship is the most basic instance of social structure of which descent and marriage are prime examples. Findler and 
Dhulipalla (1999:168) argue that the human relationship of marriage continues to be the most influential determinant of 
human behavior. Kinship in the form of marriage was referenced in this case study to determine whether a taxpayer’s non-
compliance is influenced by his/her social structure. Based on the limited social structures explored, the theories tested in this 
case study are working theories to be refined by future research. The study tested the following working theories: 
• Working theory 1 (WT1): A non-compliant taxpayer becomes compliant when a revenue collection agency requests the 
taxpayer to do so. WT1 was tested by means of a call center agent telephonically engaging with a married female 
taxpayer requesting the taxpayer to become compliant. The theory was considered true when a statistically significant 
amount of taxpayers became compliant, but false if taxpayers remained non-compliant. 
• Working theory 2 (WT2): Revenue collection agencies can obtain automatic taxpayer compliance by influencing the 
social structure in which the taxpayer operates. WT2 was tested against the social structure of marriage in which both the 
husband and wife are non-compliant and WT1 proved true. Thus, WT2 is only considered for the male/husband cases 
where the female/wife taxpayers became compliant after engaging with a call center agent. WT2 was proven true when 
both husband and wife became compliant after the engagement. WT2 was proven false when a husband failed to become 
compliant despite his wife becoming compliant after interaction with a call center agent. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The Case Study 
A revenue collection agency forms an integral part of the economic services delivered by any government. The taxes 
collected enables government to facilitate economic growth and distribution, as well as to improve the social development of 
its citizens. SARS has been appointed as the agency responsible for the collection of revenue as well as the enforcement of 
tax regulation and compliance in South Africa. The revenue collected consists of taxes, duties and levies. The revenue 
collection targets defined for recent financial years, namely R598.7 billion (2010) and R647.2 billion (2011), have 
comfortably been achieved by SARS. As at the 2011 financial year end, the organization employed 14,967 staff. SARS’s 
enforcement capacity conducted 79,631 audits with a success rate of 83% for investigative audits, resulting in a collection of 
R3.9 billion. 
Another important enforcement capacity is the collection of outstanding tax returns. An outstanding tax return is best 
described as a period-based tax return for which the respective taxpayer has failed to submit the required tax return. This non-
compliance is countered through the automatic allocation of administrative penalties to the taxpayer accounts. In addition to 
this, outstanding tax return cases are also telephonically pursued by the SARS outbound call center. The call-center agents 
typically act on an automatically generated list of non-compliant taxpayers by asking these taxpayers to submit the required 
outstanding tax returns within seven working days, or face legal action. Taxpayers with invalid contact details are escalated 
to a tracing department which uses external information to update the taxpayer’s contact particulars before further 
engagement with the taxpayer. 
Research Methodology and Variables 
Case study research through the positivist research paradigm can provide detailed insights and social explanations. A case 
study research is described by Oates (2006:141) as a comprehensive and concentrated evaluation of a phenomenon in its 
natural presence, in an attempt to generate new knowledge on the subject. This case study’s particulars are in accordance with 
Yin’s (2009:47-53) prescription: the study focuses on a single case with SARS being the only unit of analysis. The research 
is considered a critical explanatory case because well formulated theories on tax non-compliance are evaluated against the 
mature knowledge domains of SNA and DSS. Although limited in nature, the study aims to generate theories representative 
of revenue collection agencies in general. 
The data collection used in this study is by means of random statistical sampling. Using the terminology defined by Findler 
and Dhulipalla (1999:169), the social networks explored in this research are as follows: 
• Each social structure was limited to two members, namely a male taxpayer and female taxpayer with both having at least 
one outstanding tax return; 
• The primary relationship of the structure was that of kinship in the specific form of marriage; and 
• The wife member was selected as the central member of this structure. This selection is based on the assumption that a wife 
is more likely to influence the structure through communication than the husband. The husband is therefore considered as 
the related member of the structure. 
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The case study’s population consisted of 1,013 married couples which were randomly divided into an action group and 
control group sub-populations. The control group consisted of 535 couples (observations), whereas the action group consisted 
of 478 couples (observations). For the action group, the wife was telephonically contacted by a SARS call-center agent and 
requested to submit any of her outstanding tax returns. No contact was made with the control group, reflecting the “natural” 
taxpayer submission behavior materializing without any intervention by SARS. The presence of the call in the action group, 
and the absence thereof in the control group, allow for the call’s impact on taxpayer compliance to be measured. The change 
in taxpayer compliance was analyzed three weeks after the conclusion of the SARS call center effort. The taxpayer was 
regarded as having become compliant if any, i.e. at least one, of the outstanding tax returns have been submitted during the 
three week duration. 
The relationship between the call made to the wife, the submission behavior of the wife and the submission behavior of the 
husband was determined by a Logit model. A Logit model was selected since the modeling variables are binary resulting in 
ordinary least square assumptions to be violated. In binary regression models, the expected signs of the regression 
coefficients and their statistical significance are of greater importance than the goodness of fit. This is partly because of the 
limited variables used for the model as limited by the study’s scope. Other variables, such as taxpayer’s attributes could also 




Zi ranges from -∞ to + ∞.  
Pi ranges between 0 and 1 and is non-linear related to Zi.. 
; 
 Therefore  
 With  the odds ratio. 
Taking the natural log: 
 
Hence, L, the log of the odds ratio, is not only linear in X, but also linear in the parameters. L is referred to as the logit. The 
Logit model has the following features: 
• As P goes from 0 to 1 (i.e. as Z varies from -∞ to + ∞), the logit L goes from -∞ to + ∞. In other words, although the 
probabilities lie between 0 and 1, the logits are not so bounded. 
• Although L is linear in X, the probabilities themselves are not. 
The logit becomes negative and increasingly large in magnitude as the odds ratio decreases from 1 to 0; and becomes 
increasingly large and positive as the odds ratio increases from 1 to infinity. 
Models were estimated through Maximum Likelihood methods, using E-Views7. The following variables are specified in 
order to determine the relationship(s) between the call made to the wife, the tax return submission behavior of the wife, as 
well as the tax return submission behavior of the husband: 
• Action_Group (Differentiating between the Control group and the Action group): The control group takes on a value of 0, 
and the action group a value of 1. This variable allows the impact of the call to be measured. 
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• Wife_Submit (Submission behavior of wives): Wives that submitted take on a value of 1; those that omitted to submit are 
represented by zeros. If at least one return has been submitted, the wife is regarded as having submitted. 
• Husband_Submit (Submission behavior of husbands): Husbands that submitted take on a value of 1; those that omitted to 
submit are represented by zeros. If at least one return has been submitted, the husband is regarded as having submitted. 
Population Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the submission statistics of the case study’s control group and action group. 
Husband Submit 9 35% 
Wife Submit 26 5% 
Husband Not Submit 17 65% 
Husband Submit 5 1% 
Control Group 535 
Wife Not Submit 509 95% 
Husband Not Submit 504 99% 
Husband Submit 27 19% 
Wife Submit 142 30% 
Husband Not Submit 115 81% 
Husband Submit 8 2% 
Action Group 478 
Wife Not Submit 336 70% 
Husband Not Submit 328 98% 
Total 1,013 
Table 1. Submission Behavior Summary 
Overall Submission Behavior of Wife 
5% of wives (26 observations) in the control group submitted outstanding tax returns, compared to 30% of wives (142 
observations) in the action group, suggesting that the call center engagement with the wife has a significantly positive impact 
on her decision to become compliant. 
Overall Submission Behavior of Husband, Regardless of Wife’s Behavior 
3% of husbands (14 observations) in the control group submitted outstanding tax returns; compared to 7% of husbands (35 
observations) in the action group; suggesting that the call to the wife might impact positively on the husband’s submission 
behavior, regardless of the wife’s decision to submit or not. 
Submission Behavior of Social Structure 
2% of couples (9 observations) submitted at least one outstanding return (i.e. both husband and wife submitted) in the control 
group, compared to 6% (27 observations) in the action group, suggesting that the call to the wife is impacting positively on 
the couple’s tax compliance behavior. 
Submission behavior of husband, given submission behavior of wife 
For the control group, the probability of a tax return submission by a husband, given that his wife has submitted, is 35% (9 
observations from a population size of 26). A mere 1% of husbands in the control group submitted outstanding tax returns, 
when their wives did not. For the action group, the probability of a tax return submission by a husband, given that his wife 
has submitted, is 19% (27 observations from a population size of 142). Only 2% of husbands in the action group submitted 
outstanding tax returns, when their wives did not. It is concluded that husbands are more likely to submit tax returns if their 
wives have also submitted. 
FINDINGS 
Working Theory 1 (WT 1) 
WT1 states that a non-compliant taxpayer will become compliant when a revenue collection agency requests the taxpayer to 
do so. In order to determine the impact of the call center engagements on the wife’s compliance behavior, the Action_Group 
variable was modeled onto the Wife_Submit variable. The call to the wife had a significant positive impact on the wife’s 
decision to submit. Wives that received calls were 8 times more likely to submit than those who did not. The overall accuracy 
of the estimated model can be assessed by the Expectation-Prediction table, which shows that the estimated model correctly 
predicts 75% of the observations. Both the H-L statistic and the Andrews statistics indicate that the data fits the model well. 
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Regression Output 
Dependent Variable: WIFE_SUBMIT  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ACTION_GROUP 2.113067 0.224599 9.408187 0.0000 
C -2.974352 0.201063 -14.79316 0.0000 
     
     McFadden R-squared 0.132487    Mean dependent var 0.165844 
S.D. dependent var 0.372124    S.E. of regression 0.350995 
Akaike info criterion 0.783383    Sum squared resid 124.5523 
Schwarz criterion 0.793098    Log likelihood -394.7833 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.787073    Deviance 789.5666 
Restr. deviance 910.1497    Restr. log likelihood -455.0748 
LR statistic 120.5831    Avg. log likelihood -0.389717 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Obs with Dep=0 845     Total obs 1013 
Obs with Dep=1 168    
     
     
 
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Success cutoff: C = 0.5    
    
                Estimated Equation 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
    
    E(# of Dep=0) 720.45 124.55 845.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 124.55 43.45 168.00 
Total 845.00 168.00 1013.00 
Correct 720.45 43.45 763.90 
% Correct 85.26 25.86 75.41 
% Incorrect 14.74 74.14 24.59 
    
     
Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation for Binary Specification    
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Tests       
Grouping based upon predicted risk (randomize ties)    
         
              Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.0486 0.0486 94 96.0916 7 4.90841 101 0.93680 
2 0.0486 0.0486 96 96.0916 5 4.90841 101 0.00180 
3 0.0486 0.0486 98 96.0916 3 4.90841 101 0.77990 
4 0.0486 0.0486 97 97.0430 5 4.95701 102 0.00039 
5 0.0486 0.0486 96 96.0916 5 4.90841 101 0.00180 
6 0.0486 0.2971 82 78.2015 19 22.7985 101 0.81737 
7 0.2971 0.2971 75 71.6987 27 30.3013 102 0.51167 
8 0.2971 0.2971 75 70.9958 26 30.0042 101 0.76021 
 9 0.2971 0.2971 69 70.9958 32 30.0042 101 0.18886 
10 0.2971 0.2971 63 71.6987 39 30.3013 102 3.55256 
         
           Total 845 845.000 168 168.000 1013 7.55135 
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H-L Statistic 7.5514  Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.4785  
Andrews Statistic 7.5193  Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.6757  
         
         
 
Working Theory 2 (WT2) 
WT2 states that revenue collection agencies can obtain automatic taxpayer compliance by influencing the social structure in 
which the taxpayer operates. In order to determine whether the call center engagement and the submission behavior of a male 
taxpayer’s wife impacts on that of the husband, the Action_Group and Wife_Submit variables were modeled onto the 
Husband_Submit variable. Since the call to the male taxpayer’s wife was found to be statistically insignificant, the model had 
to be refitted to exclude the Action_Group variable. The wife’s submission behavior illustrated a positive significant impact 
on that of her husband. Husbands that have wives who submit are 17 times more likely to submit than those who did not. 
According to the Expectation-Prediction table, the model correctly predicted 92% of the observations. According to the H-L 
test statistic, the data fit the model well; this is however contradicted by the Andrew’s statistic which is lower than the 
prescribed 0.05. The Andrew statistic can be improved by including more variables, as previously stated. 
Regression Output 
Dependent Variable: HUSBAND_SUBMIT  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ACTION_GROUP -0.087898 0.382530 -0.229782 0.8183 
WIFE_SUBMIT 2.899547 0.380290 7.624572 0.0000 
C -4.124823 0.314594 -13.11156 0.0000 
     
     McFadden R-squared 0.212933    Mean dependent var 0.048371 
S.D. dependent var 0.214655    S.E. of regression 0.201468 
Akaike info criterion 0.310819    Sum squared resid 40.99529 
Schwarz criterion 0.325391    Log likelihood -154.4296 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.316354    Deviance 308.8592 
Restr. deviance 392.4181    Restr. log likelihood -196.2090 
LR statistic 83.55883    Avg. log likelihood -0.152448 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Obs with Dep=0 964     Total obs 1013 
Obs with Dep=1 49    
     
     
 
Regression Output 
Dependent Variable: HUSBAND_SUBMIT  
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     WIFE_SUBMIT 2.859600 0.336865 8.488856 0.0000 
C -4.158883 0.279508 -14.87931 0.0000 
     
     McFadden R-squared 0.212799    Mean dependent var 0.048371 
S.D. dependent var 0.214655    S.E. of regression 0.201590 
Akaike info criterion 0.308896    Sum squared resid 41.08571 
Schwarz criterion 0.318611    Log likelihood -154.4559 
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.312586    Deviance 308.9119 
Restr. deviance 392.4181    Restr. log likelihood -196.2090 
LR statistic 83.50620    Avg. log likelihood -0.152474 
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000    
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Obs with Dep=0 964     Total obs 1013 
Obs with Dep=1 49    
     
     
 
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Success cutoff: C = 0.5    
       
            Estimated Equation 
 Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
    
    E(# of Dep=0) 922.91 41.09 964.00 
E(# of Dep=1) 41.09 7.91 49.00 
Total 964.00 49.00 1013.00 
Correct 922.91 7.91 930.83 
% Correct 95.74 16.15 91.89 
% Incorrect 4.26 83.85 8.11 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Evaluation for Binary Specification    
Andrews and Hosmer-Lemeshow Tests      
         
              Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
         
         1 0.0154 0.0154 100 99.4462 1 1.55385 101 0.20050 
2 0.0154 0.0154 101 99.4462 0 1.55385 101 1.57813 
3 0.0154 0.0154 98 99.4462 3 1.55385 101 1.36696 
4 0.0154 0.0154 101 100.431 1 1.56923 102 0.20971 
5 0.0154 0.0154 100 99.4462 1 1.55385 101 0.20050 
6 0.0154 0.0154 99 99.4462 2 1.55385 101 0.13011 
7 0.0154 0.0154 101 100.431 1 1.56923 102 0.20971 
8 0.0154 0.0154 98 99.4462 3 1.55385 101 1.36696 
9 0.0154 0.2143 87 86.3187 14 14.6813 101 0.03700 
10 0.2143 0.2143 79 80.1429 23 21.8571 102 0.07605 
         
           Total 964 964.000 49 49.0000 1013 5.37561 
         
         H-L Statistic 5.3756  Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.7168  
Andrews Statistic 104.2144  Prob. Chi-Sq(10) 0.0000  
 
CONCLUSION 
The tax gap is likely to remain a significant challenge for revenue collection agencies. This study suggests that the limited 
enforcement capacity of revenue collection agencies can achieve significantly more by focusing on the social structure in 
which non-compliant taxpayers operate. These social structures include elementary kinship structures such as marriage and 
descent, but also more elaborate structures such as communities, institutions and even geographical clusters. Although 
limited in scope, this study empirically substantiates the proposal that taxpayer compliance is influenced by the social 
structures of the taxpayer. A single interaction with the social structure will have a cascading influence on the other social 
structure members. This is in contrast to the typical pursuit of single, unrelated instances of non-compliance which is 
characteristic to most revenue collection agencies. These social structures can be visualized, discovered and explored using 
SNA in conjunction with different DSS technologies, in particular data warehousing and business intelligence. 
The paper, therefore, makes a contribution to Information Systems theory by illustrating how Social Network Analysis can be 
used to complement existing decisions support systems. It also demonstrates the value of quantitative case studies to amend 
theoretical knowledge. On a practical level, the study suggests an efficient way to maximize the impact of interventions to 
ensure tax compliance by using business intelligence gleaned from technical decision support systems. The research fills a 
gap in literature by demonstrating IT’s value proposition towards government financial services. The study is limited to only 
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one form of social structure, and future research should try to verify the findings by applying the same principles to other 
social structures, as well as other business domains. 
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